The classical stable marriage problem asks for a matching between a set of men and a set of women with no blocking pairs, which are pairs formed by a man and a woman who would both prefer switching from their current status to be paired up together. When both men and women have strict preferences over the opposite group, all stable matchings have the same cardinality, and the famous Gale-Shapley algorithm can be used to find one. Differently, if we allow ties in the preference lists, finding a stable matching of maximum cardinality is an NP-hard problem, already when the ties are one-sided, that is, they appear only in the preferences of one group. For this reason, many researchers have focused on developing approximation algorithm for this problem.
Introduction
The stable marriage problem is one of the most classical and famous algorithmic game theory problems. We are here given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E), where, according to the widely used terminology, A represents a set of men, and B represents a set of women. Each individual a ∈ A (resp. b ∈ B) is adjacent to a subset N (a) ⊆ B (resp. N (b) ⊆ A) of individuals, representing the subset of people (s)he would accept to be matched to. Furthermore, each c ∈ A ∪ B has strict preferences over the individuals in N (c). The goal is to compute a stable matching M , that is a matching which does not contain a blocking pair. Formally, a blocking pair (a, b) for a matching M is given by two individuals a ∈ A and b ∈ B with (a, b) ∈ E \ M , such that a is either unmatched in M or he prefers b to his current partner, and similarly b is either unmatched in M or she prefers a to his current partner. Intuitively, if there exists a blocking pair (a, b) for a given matching M , then both a and b have an incentive to deviate from their current status, making the matching M be an unstable outcome. The seminal work of Gale and Shapley [2] shows that a stable matching always exists, and gives an elegant polynomial-time algorithm to find one. Since then, stable matchings have been extensively studied in the literature, and many beautiful properties are known about their structure. In particular, all stable matchings in a graph have the same cardinality [3] .
The situation becomes significantly different when the preferences among individuals are not strict anymore, and we allow ties. In fact, in the presence of ties, stable matchings can have different cardinalities, and computing a stable matching of maximum size is NP-hard (in fact, APX-hard) [8, 13, 6] . Due to the importance of finding stable matchings of large size in many real-world applications, it is not surprising that many researchers in the algorithmic community have focused on developing approximation algorithms for the stable marriage problem with ties [10, 9, 7, 5, 15, 14, 6] .
A special case which received a lot of attention, is the stable marriage with one-sided ties, i.e., where only one group (say, the women) are allowed to have ties in their preferences over the opposite group. This setting finds many applications in real-world instances, such as in the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) (we refer to [12] for details). For this case, Kiraly [9] gave a 3 2 -approximation bound, later improved to a 25 17 -approximation bound by Iwama et al. [7] . Huang and Telikepalli [5] developed a new algorithm and showed that their algorithm achieves the approximation factor at most 22 15 . Subsequently, Radnai [16] showed that the algorithm of Huang and Telikepalli [5] has approximation factor at most 41 28 . Dean and Jalasutram [1] improved the analysis of the algorithm proposed by Iwama et al. [7] to 19 13 , and this has been the best known approximation factor for the problem until recently.
From an hardness point of view, the strongest bounds are given in [4] , which showed that the stable marriage problem with one-sided ties is NP-hard to approximate within a factor of 21 19 , and strengthened the bound to 5 4 assuming Unique Game Conjecture.
Our results and techniques. In this paper, we give a refined analysis of the algorithm of Huang and Telikepalli [5] , which shows that the algorithm is indeed a 13 9 -approximation algorithm for the problem. Note that the factor 13 9 ≈ 1.444 is strictly better than the factor 19 13 ≈ 1.461 given in [1] . An interesting feature of the combinatorial algorithm of [5] is that, differently from the classical Gale-Shapley procedure, each man can make two proposals and each woman can accept two proposals. When men stop proposing, the set of accepted proposals yields a graph G ′ where each individual can have degree up to 2, and the matching M output by the algorithm will be a maximum cardinality matching in G ′ which satisfies some additional properties.
Given a stable matching M output by their algorithm and a stable matching OPT of maximum cardinality, the idea of [5] for proving the approximation bound is the following. They consider the M -augmenting paths in the symmetric difference (M ⊕ OPT) of M and OPT. It is not difficult to show that Maugmenting paths of size 3 (i.e. with 3 edges) cannot exist, if the algorithm is executed properly. However, there could be an augmenting path of size 5 or larger. In particular, augmenting paths of size 5 are problematic, since for such paths the ratio between the number of the edges in OPT and M is 3/2, and therefore exceeds the claimed approximation bound. Huang and Telikepalli [5] are able to charge each augmenting path of size 5 to some component of M ⊕ OPT of a larger size. The crux of the analysis lies in defining a map between augmenting paths of size 5, and large components of M ⊕ OPT, such that each large component does not get charged too many times. In order to define this map, they study the structure of an auxiliary directed graph H which is obtained from G ′ by orienting its edges and contracting some edges of M which belong to 5-augmenting paths.
Our improvement is based on defining a better mapping between augmenting paths of size 5, and large components of M ⊕ OPT. In order to do this, we construct a slightly different auxiliary directed graph H, where we contract more edges of M (not just the ones in 5-augmenting paths as is done in [5] ). We study the structure of this new graph, and introduce two crucial concepts: popular women, and jumps. In particular, jumps are central to our refined charging scheme, and together with the concept of popular women, we are able to provide a better analysis of the algorithm.
Interestingly, an example by Radnai [16] shows that our analysis is tight. For the sake of completeness, also in this paper we report an instance where the algorithm effectively computes a solution which is away from the optimal one by a factor of 13 9 . This shows that our charging scheme is essentially best possible, and modifications in the algorithm are necessary in order to further improve the approximation bound.
Remark: Very recently, Lam and Plaxton [11] have posted online a paper showing a ln(4) ≈ 1.386 algorithm for the problem. This is achieved by improving the algorithm and technique of [7] and [1] . The work of Lam and Plaxton [11] was done indipendently from our work. Though their factor is strictly better than ours, their algorithm involves solving an LP, while the algorithm of Huang and Telikepalli [5] , that we use here, is a purely combinatorial algorithm, which is one of the nicest aspects of it. Therefore our result is of independent interest.
Algorithm by Huang and Telikepalli
First, let us describe the algorithm by Huang and Telikepalli [5] . A stable matching is computed in two phases. In the first phase, which is the proposal phase, men (in arbitrary order) make proposals to women, while women accept or reject proposals. It is important to highlight that at any point of time each men can simultaneously make up to two proposals, and women are allowed to accept up to two proposals. This phase stops when all men stop making proposals. Subsequently, one computes a maximum cardinality matching with some properties in the graph induced by all the accepted proposals. In this graph, every node can have degree at most two (since both men and women are allowed to make/accept up to two proposals). We describe the process in more details in the next paragraphs.
How men propose.
Each man a ∈ A has two proposals p At each moment of the algorithm every man has one of the following three statuses: basic, 1-promoted and 2-promoted. Each man a ∈ A starts as a basic man. If each woman in N (a) at least once rejected any proposal of a, the man a becomes 1-promoted. If afterwards each woman in N (a) at least once rejected any proposal of a as a 1-promoted man, the man a becomes 2-promoted. Finally, if each woman in N (a) at least once rejected any proposal of a as a 2-promoted man, the man a stops making proposals.
How women accept proposals.
A woman b, who gets a proposal from a man a, always accepts the current proposal of a if at the moment b holds at most one proposal, excluding the current proposal of a. Otherwise, if b holds already two proposals when she receives the proposal of a, then b rejects a least desirable proposal among these three (see Definition 1), and keeps the other two (if more than one proposal among the ones considered satisfies Definition 1, ties are broken arbitrarily). • b is indifferent between a and a ′ ; a is currently 2-promoted while a ′ is not 2-promoted.
• b is indifferent between a and a ′ ; a is currently 1-promoted while a ′ is basic.
• b is indifferent between a and a ′ ; a and a ′ are basic; moreover, woman b has already rejected a proposal of a while b did not reject any proposal of a ′ .
A proposal p i a is a least desirable proposal among a set of proposals that a woman b has, if it is not superior to any of the proposals in the set.
What is the output matching.
Let G ′ be the bipartite (simple) graph with the node set A ∪ B and the edge set E ′ , where E ′ consists of the edges (a, b), a ∈ A and b ∈ B such that at the end of the algorithm b holds at least one proposal of a. Clearly, the degree of a node in G ′ is at most two, since each man has at most two proposals and each woman has at most two proposals accepted at each time point. Let M be a maximum cardinality matching in G ′ , where all degree two nodes of G ′ are matched. In [5] , it was shown that the matching M is a stable matching in the graph G.
Useful properties and notations.
Let OPT be a maximum cardinality stable matching in G. Then M ⊕ OPT consists of paths and cycles. We will say that a path is an augmenting path in M ⊕ OPT if it is augmenting with respect to M . Unless explicitly stated otherwise, a man a ∈ A is called basic, 1-promoted and 2-promoted if after the end of the algorithm a is basic, 1-promoted or 2-promoted, respectively. A man a ∈ A is called promoted if a is either 1-promoted or 2-promoted.
The following two lemmas are from [5] , and give some useful properties of augmenting paths in M ⊕OPT. For the completeness sake we provide the proofs of these two lemmas in Appendix.
Lemma 1 ([5]
). There is no 3-augmenting path in M ⊕ OPT.
• α 0 is a 2-promoted man and has been rejected by β 0 as a 2-promoted man.
• α 2 is basic and α 2 prefers β 1 to β 2 .
• α 1 is not 2-promoted and α 1 prefers β 1 to β 0 .
• β 1 is indifferent between α 1 and α 2 .
• In G ′ , β 0 has degree 1 if and only if α 1 has degree 1.
• In G ′ , β 1 has degree 1 if and only if α 2 has degree 1.
Further in the paper, we use ≤, ≥, >, <, ≃ to indicate preferences. For example, a > b c stands for b strictly prefers a to c. For a node a in G, M (a) and OPT(a) stand for the node matched with a by M and OPT, respectively. If a is not matched by M or OPT, we define M (a) and OPT(a) to be ∅, respectively.
Tight Analysis
As in [5] , we will now construct a digraph H, starting from G ′ , which will be used for our charging scheme. First, we orient all edges in the graph G ′ from men to women. Second, for each augmenting path of the form α 0 −β 0 −α 1 −· · ·−α k −β k with α i ∈ A and β i ∈ B for all i = 0, 1, . . . , k, we contract the edge (α 1 , β 0 ) into a single node (we call the resulting node an x-node) and we contract the edge (α k , β k−1 ) into a single node (we call the resulting node a y-node). Note that this second step in the construction of the graph H is different from the construction in [5] , which is based only on augmenting paths of length 5. We refer to the x-and y-nodes of H as red; and to the other nodes of H as blue.
is an x-node or a y-node, respectively. A crucial concept is that of critical arcs and good paths, defined below.
• a is not 2-promoted.
• [a] is not a y-node.
Definition 3. A (directed) path in H is called good if it starts with a blue man, ends with a blue woman, and no edge of the path is in M .
We now state a lemma which gives certain properties of the graph H. These properties are analogous to the properties proven in [5] . However, since our definition of H and our definition of a critical arc is different from the definitions in [5] , we provide a proof of this lemma in Appendix.
Lemma 3.
The graph H satisfies the following statements.
(a) There is no arc from a y-node to an x-node.
(b) No critical arc starts at a y-node and no critical arc ends at an x-node.
(c) Every critical arc is contained in some good path.
(d) Every good path has at most one critical arc.
(e) Every two distinct good paths are node-disjoint.
Popularity
In order to obtain a better charging scheme, we here introduce the concept of popular women. This concept plays a key role later in our analysis.
Definition 4. At a given time point, a proposal from c ∈ A to b ∈ B is a-good (for a ∈ A) if c ≥ b a, and at least one of the following is true
• c is promoted at the given time point
• c was rejected by b before the given time point
Definition 5. For a ∈ A and b ∈ B, b is a-popular if at the end of the algorithm b holds two a-good proposals.
The following lemma is a straightforward observation. The next lemmas will be useful later.
Lemma 5. For a ∈ A and b ∈ B, the number of a-good proposals which b holds does not decrease over time. Furthermore, if b is not a-popular, b rejected a at most one time.
Proof. First, note that a proposal from c ∈ A to b ∈ B that is not a-good for some a ∈ A at some point in time, can become a-good at some later point in time. For example, this can happen when c becomes promoted. However, once a proposal becomes a-good, it will remain so until the end of the algorithm. To complete the proof of the first statement, it remains to show that at no point in time b rejects an a-good proposal for a not a-good proposal. Let us assume the contrary, i.e. that at some point in time b ∈ B rejects an a-good proposal from c ∈ A for a not a-good proposal from d ∈ A. We have c ≥ b a and a ≥ b d, since the proposal from c is a-good and the proposal from d is not. We also have d ≥ b c, since b rejects the proposal of c for the proposal from d. Thus, we have a ≃ b c ≃ b d. Moreover, since the proposal from d is not a-good, d is not promoted and was not rejected by b before the given time point. However, since b rejects the proposal from c for the proposal from d, at this time point c is also neither promoted nor was rejected by b before. Hence, the proposal from c is not a-good, contradiction.
For the second statement, note that if b ∈ B rejects a ∈ A once, then all subsequent proposals of a to b are a-good. Thus, due to the above argumentation, if at some time point b rejects a for the second time, then at that time point b holds two a-good proposals. Hence, at the end of the algorithm b holds two a-good proposals as well, i.e. b is a-popular.
Lemma 6. Let a ∈ A be basic, then the less preferred neighbor of a in G ′ is not a-popular.
Proof. Let b ∈ B be the less preferred neighbor of a in G ′ . It is sufficient to show that at the end of the algorithm, b holds a proposal that is not a-good. Note, b did not reject a at any time point. Moreover, since a is basic, any proposal of a to b is not a-good.
is a 5-augmenting path and β 1 is not α 1 -popular, then there is a critical arc next to β 1 .
Proof. Let us assume that for all b ∈ B such that (α 1 , b) is an arc in G ′ , we have β 1 > α1 b. Then β 1 rejected α 1 at least twice, contradicting Lemma 5.
Thus, there exists b ∈ B such that (
Jumps
The second concept that will be central for our improved analysis, is that of jumps. We start with introducing matching jumps. Each such jump defines a map from a woman, which is not isolated in G ′ but is not matched by M , to a uniquely defined woman, which is matched by M . Lemma 9. Let b ∈ B be not matched by M , such that b is not an isolated node in G ′ . Then, the node mjump(b) is either a blue woman in the graph H or is in a y-node.
Proof. It is enough to show that mjump(b) is not in an x-node. Note that if a woman c ∈ B is in an x-node, then this woman holds two proposals at the end of the algorithm. Thus, c either has degree 2 in the graph G ′ or (c, M (c)) forms a connected component of G ′ (that is, both two proposals held by c are from M (c)). However, by the definition mjump(b) is an end node of a maximal (not directed) path in G ′ , where one of the end nodes is a woman not matched by M , contradiction.
As follows from the above lemma, a matching jump can result in a blue node or in a y-node. However, for reasons to become clear later, we would like jumps to map to a blue woman. Sometimes a matching jump indeed ends in a y-node. In such cases, the next type of jumps, path jumps, helps to do a further jump to a uniquely defined blue woman. Finally, we introduce a map matching jump with exception, which combines the previous two jumps. The next lemma is used to guarantee that at certain stages of our charging scheme the same nodes do not get charged multiple times. 
Charging scheme
To show the tight approximation guarantee of the algorithm in [5] , we use the following charging scheme. The charging scheme is conducted in five stages, which are described below.
1. Each man who is in a y-node from a 5-augmenting path receives a charge of 1.
2. Each man with a nonzero charge passes on his charge to his less preferred neighbor in G ′ .
Every woman b ∈ B with a nonzero charge and who is not matched by M , passes all her charge to mjump(b).
(Note that if a woman has a nonzero charge at the beginning of this stage, then she is not isolated in G ′ , and hence this step is well defined. We call the charge a woman received at stages 2 and 3 unpopularitycharge and call the charge a woman received at stages 4 and 5 path-charge. If a woman receives charge at stages 2 and 3, but passes on that charge at stage 4, we say that this woman has zero unpopularity-charge. Lemma 14. At the end of the charging scheme, only women matched by M have a nonzero charge.
Proof. From the charging scheme, it is clear that only women may have a nonzero charge at the end of the charging scheme.
Let us discuss how a woman c ∈ B, who is not matched by M , may receive a nonzero charge during the charging scheme. First, c cannot receive a nonzero charge in stage 1. Second, if c receives a charge at stage 2, then c passes on this charge at stage 3. Third, note that for every b ∈ B which is not matched by M and is not isolated in Lemma 16. At the end of the charging scheme, no woman in an x-node has a nonzero unpopularity-charge.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists a woman c ∈ B, who is in an x-node and holds a nonzero unpopularity-charge at the end of the charging scheme. By Lemma 3, in G ′ the node c is adjacent to no man in a y-node. Thus, c does not receive any charge at stage 2.
Thus, c received a nonzero charge at stage 3. So c is an end node of a (not directed non trivial) maximal path in G ′ , where both end nodes are distinct women. However, since c is in an x-node then either c has degree 2 in G ′ or (c, M (c)) forms a connected component of G ′ , contradiction.
Lemma 17. At the end of the charging scheme, no woman in a 5-augmenting path has a nonzero charge.
Proof. Let α 0 − β 0 − α 1 − β 1 − α 2 − β 2 be a 5-augmenting path, where α 0 , α 1 , α 2 ∈ A and β 0 , β 1 , β 2 ∈ B. First, β 2 is not matched by M and thus has no charge at the end of the charging scheme by Lemma 14.
Second, β 0 has no unpopularity-charge by Lemma 16 and no path-charge by Lemma 15, since β 0 is in an x-node.
Finally, β 1 also has no path-charge by Lemma 15, since β 1 is in a y-node. To finish the proof, it remains to show that at the end of the charging scheme β 1 has no unpopularity-charge.
Let us assume that β 1 receives a nonzero unpopularity charge at stage 3. Then β 1 = mjump(b) for some b ∈ B, where b is not matched by M and is not isolated in G ′ . Thus, β 1 is the end node of a maximal (not directed) path in G ′ containing at least two distinct women. However, the degree of β 1 in G ′ equals the degree of α 2 in G ′ by Lemma 2, and so β 1 cannot be the end node of a maximal (not directed) path in H ′ containing at least two distinct women. Let us assume that β 1 receives a nonzero unpopularity charge at stage 2. Thus there exists a ∈ A, such that a is in a y-node and β 1 is the less preferred neighbor of a in G ′ . Since a is in a y-node, a is basic and hence β 1 is not a-popular by Lemma 6.
Since a is in a y-node, OPT(a) is not matched by M and β 1 ≥ a OPT(a). Note that β 1 is distinct from OPT(a), since β 1 is matched by M , implying β 1 > a OPT(a). Thus, we have α 1 ≥ β1 a, because otherwise OPT is not a stable matching in G. By Lemma 4, α 1 ≥ β1 a implies that β 1 is not α 1 -popular. Hence, by Lemma 7 there is a critical arc next to β 1 and so β 1 passes on her unpopularity-charge at stage 4.
Lemma 18. After stages 2 and 3, every woman has a charge of at most 2. Furthermore, after stages 2 and 3, each woman, who is not matched by M with a man from a 5-augmenting path, has a charge of at most 1.
Proof. Every woman has at most 2 neighbors in G ′ . Thus, each woman has a charge of at most 2 after stage 2.
Let us assume that a woman c ∈ B receives a charge at stage 3 passed from some woman b ∈ B. Then, both b and c are the end nodes of a maximal (not directed) path in G ′ . Hence, both b and c have degree 1 in G ′ , and thus both b and c have a charge of at most 1 after stage 2. So after stage 3, c has a charge of at most 2.
Let us show the second part of the statement. If c is a woman not matched by M , then it is straightforward to see that c receives a charge of at most 1 at stage 2 and receives no charge at stage 3. Now, suppose that (a, c) ∈ M for some a ∈ A and c ∈ B, where a is not in a 5-augmenting path. Thus, a has a charge of zero after stage 1. Hence, after stage 2 c has a charge of at most 1. If c receives a nonzero charge at stage 3, then c is an end node of a maximal (not directed) path in G ′ , and hence has degree 1 in G ′ , showing that c has a charge of 0 after stage 2 and a charge of 1 after stage 3.
Lemma 19. After the end of the charging scheme, every woman has a pathcharge of at most 2.
Proof. The plan of the proof is as follows. First, we prove that no woman receives a nonzero charge at both stage 4 and stage 5. Then we prove that every woman receives charge of at most 2 at stage 4, and finally we prove that every woman receives a charge of at most 2 at stage 5. Lemma 20. At the end of the charging scheme, every woman has a charge of at most 3.
Proof. Let c ∈ B be some woman. If c is not matched by M , the charge of c is zero at the end of the charging scheme by Lemma 14. If c is in a 5-augmenting path, the charge of c is zero at the end by Lemma 17.
So we may assume that c is matched by M , but is not in a 5-augmenting path. Let a ∈ A be the man such that a = M (c). Obviously, a is not in a 5-augmenting path. Thus, by Lemma 18 c has an unpopularity-charge of at most 1 at the end of the charging scheme. By Lemma 19, c has a path-charge of at most 2 at the end, so the total charge of c is at most 3. Theorem 1. Let α 0 − β 0 − · · · − α k − β k be an augmenting path of length at least 7, where α i ∈ A and β i ∈ B, i = 0, 1, . . . , k. Then there is a woman β i , i = 1, . . . , k − 1 who has zero unpopularity-charge at the end of the charging scheme.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us assume that for every i = 1, . . . , k − 1, the woman β i has a nonzero unpopularity-charge at the end of the algorithm.
For the proof we need the following definition. For i = 1, . . . , k, we say that the man α i is pointing left if α i prefers β i−1 to β i ; otherwise we say that α i is pointing right. Claim 1. There is i = 1, . . . , k − 1, such that α i is pointing right. Moreover, α k is pointing left.
Proof. First, suppose for every i = 1, . . . , k − 1, the man α i is pointing left.
In particular, α 1 is pointing left, i.e. β 0 > α1 β 1 . Hence, we also have α 0 ≥ β0 α 1 , since otherwise (β 0 , α 1 ) is a blocking pair for OPT. Note, that α 0 is 2-promoted and has degree 1 in G ′ , so β 0 rejected α 0 as a 2-promoted man. Because α 0 ≥ β0 α 1 and (α 1 , β 0 ) is in G ′ , the man α 1 is 2-promoted as well. Furthermore, α 2 is also pointing left, i.e. β 1 > α2 β 2 . Hence, we also have α 1 ≥ β1 α 2 , since otherwise (β 1 , α 2 ) is a blocking pair for OPT. Since α 1 is 2-promoted, β 1 rejected α 1 as a 1-promoted man. Because α 1 ≥ β1 α 2 and (α 2 , β 1 ) is in G ′ , we have that the man α 2 is promoted. By the statement of the theorem, β 1 has a nonzero unpopularity-charge. Since during the algorithm β 1 rejected α 1 , the woman β 1 has 2 proposals at the end of the algorithm. Hence, β 1 is not an end node of a maximal (not directed) path in G ′ containing at least two distinct women, and thus β 1 did not receive any unpopularity-charge at stage 3 of the charging scheme.
Thus, β 1 received a nonzero unpopularity-charge at stage 2. Let a ∈ A be the man who passed on his charge to β 1 at stage 2. Because a is in a y-node, a is basic at the end of the algorithm. Since α 1 and α 2 are promoted, we know that a is different from α 1 and from α 2 . Since (a, β 1 ) is an edge in G ′ and (α 1 , β 1 ) is not in G ′ even though α 1 is promoted and a is basic, we have that a > β1 α 1 = OPT(β 1 ). On the other hand, since a is in a y-node, we have that β 1 > a OPT(a), showing that (a, β 1 ) is a blocking edge for OPT, contradiction.
Finally, let us show that α k is pointing left. Note that β k is not matched by M . Thus, if α k is pointing right, the edge (α k , β k ) is blocking for M , contradiction.
By Claim 1, there exists α t , t = 1, . . . , k − 1, such that α t is pointing to the right and α t+1 is pointing to the left. Let us fix such t. Note that α t ≃ βt α t+1 , because otherwise either (α t , β t ) is blocking for M or (α t+1 , β t ) is blocking for OPT.
Claim 2. The woman β t is not α t -popular.
Proof. By the assumption β t has a nonzero unpopularity-charge. Now, let us assume that β t received a nonzero unpopularity-charge at stage 3. Then β t has one proposal at the end of the algorithm, implying that β t is not α t -popular. Now, let us assume that β t received a nonzero unpopularity-charge at stage 2. Let a ∈ A be the man who passed on a nonzero charge to β t at stage 2. Since a is in a y-node and (a, β t ) is in G ′ , we have β t > a OPT(a). Thus, we have α t ≥ βt a, because otherwise (a, β t ) is a blocking pair for OPT. Since β t is the less preferred neighbor of a in G ′ , β t is not a-popular by Lemma 6. Furthermore, α t ≥ βt a and Lemma 4, imply that β t is not α t -popular.
The next claim shows that there is a critical arc next to β t . Thus, β t passes on all of her charge at stage 4, and so β t does not have any unpopularity-charge at the end of the charging scheme, finishing the proof of the theorem.
Claim 3.
There is a critical arc next to β t .
Proof. Since β t is not α t -popular, by Lemma 5 β t rejected α t at most once. Thus, there is b ∈ B such that (α t , b) is an edge in G ′ and b ≥ αt β t = OPT(α t ). Recall, that α t is pointing right, i.e. β t > αt β t−1 , so b = β t−1 = M (α t ). Obviously, α t is not in a y-node, so (α t , b) is a critical arc next to β t .
Lemma 21. At the end of the charging scheme, the sum of charges of all women in a (2ℓ + 5)-augmenting path is at most 3ℓ .
Proof. Note that a (2ℓ + 5)-augmenting path has ℓ + 3 women. If ℓ = 0, the statement follows by Lemma 17. So we may assume ℓ ≥ 1.
The sum of the path-charges is at most 2ℓ. Indeed, the last woman has a zero path-charge by Lemma 14. The first woman and second-to-last woman both have a zero path-charge by Lemma 15, since they are not blue women. Each of the remaining ℓ women has a path-charge of at most 2 by Lemma 19.
The sum of the unpopularity-charges is at most ℓ. Indeed, the last woman has a zero unpopularity-charge by Lemma 14. The first woman has a zero unpopularity-charge by Lemma 16. By Theorem 1, there exists a woman, who is not the first woman nor the last woman and who has a zero unpopularitycharge. None of the remaining ℓ women is matched by M with a man from a 5-augmenting path. Hence, each of the remaining ℓ women has an unpopularitycharge of at most 1 by Lemma 18. Thus, the sum of charges of all women in the augmenting path is at most 3ℓ.
Theorem 2. The algorithm in [5] (described for the sake of completeness in Section 2) is a 13 9 -approximation algorithm. Proof. Let Q ′ be the set of all components of M ∪ OPT. For each q ∈ Q ′ , choose ℓ q such that:
• If q is an augmenting path, q has 2ℓ q + 5 edges.
• If q is a cycle or an even (non-augmenting) alternating path, q has 2ℓ q edges.
• If q is an odd (non-augmenting) alternating path, q has 2ℓ q − 1 edges.
Let t be the number of 5-augmenting paths and let k be the number of augmenting paths in M ⊕ OPT which have at least 7 edges. Let us also define
Claim 4. We have t ≤ 3ℓ Σ and k ≤ ℓ Σ .
Proof. Note that at the beginning of the charging scheme the sum of all charges equals t. Thus, to prove that t ≤ 3ℓ Σ it is enough to show that the sum of all charges is at most 3ℓ Σ at the end of the charging scheme.
We will prove that for every q ∈ Q ′ , the sum of the charges of the nodes in q is at most 3ℓ q . If q is an odd (non-augmenting) alternating path or an alternating cycle, then q has at most ℓ q women. Thus, the statement follows by Lemma 20. Similarly, if q is an even (non-augmenting) alternating path, the statement follows by Lemma 14 and Lemma 20. If q is an augmenting path, the statement follows directly from Lemma 21.
Finally, we have ℓ Σ ≥ k, because there are k augmenting paths with at least 7 edges and ℓ q ≥ 1 for every such augmenting path q.
Claim 5. We have |M | ≥ ℓ Σ + 2(t + k) and |OPT| ≤ ℓ Σ + 3(t + k).
Proof. First, M has at least ℓ Σ + 2(t + k) edges, since each cycle and each (nonaugmenting) alternating path q ∈ Q ′ has ℓ q edges in M and each augmenting path q ∈ Q ′ has ℓ q + 2 edges in M . Second, OPT has at most ℓ Σ + 3(t + k) edges, since each cycle and each (non-augmenting) alternating path q ∈ Q ′ has at most ℓ q edges in OPT and each augmenting path q ∈ Q ′ has ℓ q + 3 edges.
Thus, we have
where the first inequality follows from Claim 5 and the second inequality follows from Claim 4 and from the fact that the denominator is non negative.
For the sake of completeness, we give a proof that our analysis of the algorithm by Huang and Telikepalli [5] is tight. The next theorem follows from the example provided by Radnai [16] (Section 3.6.1).
Theorem 3. The bound in Theorem 2 is tight.
Proof. The instance in Figure 1 shows that the bound in Theorem 2 is tight. In Figure 1 It is straightforward to check that OPT is stable. Clearly, M is a maximum matching in G ′ . We see that |M | = 9 and |OPT| = 13. Let us verify that M is indeed a matching output by the algorithm in [5] . For this it is enough to show, that the graph G ′ can be obtained in the following run of the algorithm:
• a Note that in this example, all men are either basic at the end of the algorithm, or are always rejected during the algorithm (even as 2-promoted men). This means that simply adding more levels of promotion would not increase the algorithm's worst-case performance.
Appendix Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Let α 0 − β 0 − α 1 − β 1 be a 3-augmenting path in M ⊕ OPT, where α 0 , α 1 ∈ A and β 0 , β 1 ∈ B. Since α 0 is not matched by M , α 0 is 2-promoted. Since β 1 is not matched by M , α 1 is basic. Moreover, α 1 prefers β 0 to β 1 , since otherwise M has a blocking pair (α 1 , β 1 ). Since α 1 is basic, α 0 is 2-promoted and at the end of the algorithm β 0 has a proposal from α 1 , we have that β 0 prefers α 1 to α 0 , showing that OPT has a blocking pair (α 1 , β 0 ).
Proof of Lemma 2. First, α 0 is not matched in M and hence only one proposal of α 0 is accepted at the end of the algorithm. Hence, α 0 is 2-promoted and α 0 was rejected by β 0 as a 2-promoted man.
Second, β 2 is not matched by M and hence α 2 was never rejected by β 2 . Thus, α 2 is basic. Moreover, α 2 prefers β 1 to β 2 , since otherwise M has a blocking pair (α 2 , β 2 ).
Let us prove the first part of the third statement. If α 1 is 2-promoted, then α 1 was rejected by β 1 as a 1-promoted man. Since at the end of the algorithm β 1 has a proposal of the basic man α 2 , then β 1 prefers α 2 to α 1 . However, then (α 2 , β 1 ) is a blocking pair for OPT, contradiction.
Let us now prove the second part of the third statement. If α 1 prefers β 0 to β 1 , then β 0 does not prefer α 1 to α 0 , since otherwise (α 1 , β 0 ) is a blocking pair for OPT. Thus, either β 0 prefers α 0 to α 1 or β 0 is indifferent between α 0 and α 1 . In both cases, it is impossible at the end of the algorithm to have the situation when β 0 has a proposal of α 1 , while α 0 has at most one his proposal accepted, α 0 is 2-promoted and α 1 is not 2-promoted.
The forth statement follows from the fact that α 2 prefers β 1 to β 2 and α 1 prefers β 1 to β 0 . Thus, if β 1 is not indifferent between α 1 and α 2 , then either OPT or M is not stable.
For the fifth and sixth statements, it is enough to note that at the end of the algorithm α 1 and α 2 have both of their proposals accepted, while β 0 and β 1 hold two proposals.
Thus, b prefers a over OPT(b), since b accepted a not-2-promoted proposal of a while rejecting a 2-promoted proposal of OPT(b).
By the definition of a critical arc, b ≥ a OPT(a). Note that b is not equal to OPT(a), because OPT(b) is 2-promoted and a is not 2-promoted. Hence, a prefers b over OPT(a). This implies that (a, b) is a blocking edge for the stable matching OPT, contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3(c).
Before showing that every critical arc is contained in some good path, let us make some observations about x-nodes and y-nodes in the graph H.
In the graph H, every y-node is either isolated or has an outgoing arc in H: If the y-node consists of a ∈ A and b ∈ B, then a is basic and hence at the end of the algorithm both his proposals are accepted. If these two proposals are accepted by the same woman, namely b, then the y-node is isolated. Otherwise, the y-node has an outgoing arc.
Similarly, every x-node is either isolated or has an incoming arc. Indeed, if the x-node consists of a ∈ A and b ∈ B, then b rejected OPT(b) at least once, and hence at the end of the algorithm b holds two proposals. If these two proposals are both from the same man, namely a, then the x-node is isolated. Otherwise, the x-node has an incoming arc. is not isolated and thus [b] has an outgoing arc. Moreover, by Lemma 3(a) this outgoing arc is leading to either a blue woman or a y-node. In case this arc leads to a blue woman, we stop, otherwise we continue until we reach a blue woman in H.
We construct analogously a subpath from a blue man to [a] . From the construction it is clear that the path is a good path.
Proof of Lemma 3(d).
Note that all the internal nodes of a good path must be x-or y-nodes. To see this, assume that c is an internal blue node of a good path. Then, c is incident to two distinct edges in H, none of which is in M , contradicting the assumption that M matches all degree two nodes in the graph H. The statement then follows from Lemma 3(b) and Lemma 3(c).
Proof of Lemma 3(e). First, note that two distinct good paths cannot have common end nodes. Let us assume that c is a common end node of two distinct good paths. So c is incident to two distinct edges in H, none of which is in M , contradicting the assumption that M matches all degree two nodes in the graph H.
Now recall that all nodes in H have degree at most 2. If two distinct good paths have a common internal node, since the end nodes are different, then necessarily there is a node with degree 3 in H, a contradiction.
